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Dewey and Everyday Aesthetics - A New Look
  Kalle Puolakka 
Abstract[1]
John Dewey is frequently mentioned as an important forerunner of
everyday aesthetics.  In this article, I attempt to provide an updated
view of Dewey’s place within everyday aesthetics by drawing attention
to aspects in Dewey’s own work and in contemporary interpretations of
his philosophy that have not been thoroughly discussed in the context
of everyday aesthetics.  In the first part, I offer a reading of Dewey’s
notion of aesthetic experience that unties its content through noting the
important position Dewey ascribes to imagination in aesthetic
experience in the later parts of Art as Experience.   The second pillar of
the pragmatist theory of everyday aesthetics developed in this paper is
formed by recent Deweyan-inspired views in pragmatist ethics on the
vital role of imagination in moral life. I will place the view of everyday
aesthetics emerging from these pragmatist sources within current
developments of everyday aesthetics and defend it over other positions
on offer.
Keywords
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1. Introduction
As a sub-discipline of philosophical aesthetics, everyday aesthetics is a
relatively new phenomenon. However,  it has often been noted in the
growing literature on the aesthetics of everyday life that this field is not
without historical predecessors.[2]  A figure that most frequently comes
up in this connection is the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey; he has
even been called “the grandfather” of the discipline.[3]  That Dewey has
been widely seen as an important forerunner for everyday aesthetics,
and that his work has served as a source of inspiration for
contemporary everyday aestheticians is understandable since the
connections between the central tenets of Dewey’s classic work in
aesthetics, Art as Experience (1934), and everyday aesthetics are quite
evident.  For example, at the beginning of this work, Dewey insisted
that “in order to understand the aesthetic in its ultimate and approved
forms, one must begin with it in the raw,” that is, “in the events and
scenes that hold the attentive eye and ear of a man, arousing his
interest and affording him enjoyment as he looks and listens.”  Among
these sorts of objects and events Dewey counts such everyday
phenomena as “the fire-engine rushing by; the machines excavating
enormous holes in the earth; the human-fly climbing the steeple-
side.”[4]
Dewey expanded his attempt to restore the starting point of analyses of
aesthetic experience to non-art, everyday phenomena by developing a
critique of a view he calls “the museum conception of art.”  According to
this critique, the dichotomy between art and the everyday that Dewey
found the aesthetic theory of his time to be dominated by was based on
an erroneous conception of aesthetic experience, the historical roots of
which Dewey tries to untie in the beginning of Art as Experience.  The
idea of art museums and other art institutions as the only places where
genuine aesthetic experiences can occur was, in Dewey’s view, a result
of certain historical developments having to do with the rise of
nationalism in the Western world.  The conception of art, meshed with
nationalistic tendencies, implied a view of the art museum as “the
beauty parlor of civilization,” as Dewey’s trenchant phrase goes,[5]
where each nation exhibited its greatest artistic achievements or, in
some cases, artistic robberies.
In Dewey’s eyes, there were no winners in this development.  Art was
concealed in a realm of its own that was understood as an arena
essentially different from people’s everyday goals and interests.  There
was no room for genuine manifestations of the aesthetic in the web
formed by the needs, values, and attitudes characterizing people’s
everyday lives.  In order to achieve a genuine aesthetic experience one
had to leave this everyday baggage behind and enter the demarcated
spaces of the museum and the concert hall.[6]
Even though these critical edges of Dewey’s aesthetics connect it to the
general ethos of everyday aesthetics, the relationship of Dewey’s
aesthetic thinking to this developing field of contemporary aesthetics is
not without problems. This is because his main work in aesthetics
contains passages in which he grieves over the fact that people’s
“ordinary experience is often infected with apathy, lassitude, and
stereotype” characterized by our inability to “get neither the quality
through sense nor the meaning of things through thought.”  In these
experiences, “the ‘world’ is too much with us as burden or distraction”
and “we are not sufficiently alive to feel the tang of sense nor yet to be
moved by thought.”  “We are,” Dewey wrote, “oppressed by our
surroundings or are callous to them.”   Dewey concludes his pessimistic
analysis of ordinary experiences:  “Were it not for the oppressions and
monotonies of daily experience, the realm of dream and reverie would
not be attractive.”[7]
This analysis of ordinary experience found in Art as Experience shows
that Dewey does not find everyday phenomena, in some ways,
unreservedly aesthetic.  Rather, people’s everyday must include
experiences with specific qualities before it can be considered aesthetic
in a genuine Deweyan sense.  In this paper, I shall first shed light on
these qualities by offering a reading of Dewey’s notion of aesthetic
experience that highlights the role he attributes to imagination in this
form of experience in the later parts of Art as Experience.  Dewey’s
complex (and some might describe as rambling) account of aesthetic
experience has not been approached through his notion of imagination
as systematically as I intend to do in the first part of the paper. I
believe that this sort of approach to Dewey’s central concept helps to
illuminate some of its key features. However, it also opens up an
interesting connection to pragmatist-inspired ethics, where imagination
has been recently seen as a key element in the moral aspects of our
lives.  In this context, aesthetic experience has been considered to
have a central role in developing the capacities required in a flourishing
moral life.[8]  My belief is that this trend of pragmatism offers some
new perspectives on assessing Dewey’s significance for the more recent
developments of everyday aesthetics.
Richard Shusterman has provided a distinction between two possible
ways of understanding a theory on the aesthetics of everyday life that I
think helpfully frames some of the key debates within contemporary
everyday aesthetics.[9]  The first one concentrates on the
everydayness or ordinariness of the everyday and argues that the
feelings of familiarity, in particular that arise from everyday objects and
events, involve their own, though different, kind of aesthetic character
from those raised by artworks, where we usually value the new and the
surprising.[10]  The second understanding of everyday aesthetics
included in Shusterman’s distinction does not build the aesthetic
character of everyday objects and happenings on their familiarity and
routine-like character but takes a more reconstructive attitude toward
the everyday.  It tries to find the means to integrate those experiences
that grab people’s attention from the flow of ordinary experience and
merit a heightened perception, like the best experiences of art do, as
more significant elements of peoples’ everyday lives.[11] Dewey clearly
belongs to Shusterman’s second understanding of everyday aesthetics. 
It is my belief that the reading of Dewey’s notion of aesthetic
experience that emphasizes the role of imagination in it provides some
fresh insight into the significance of Dewey’s aesthetics for this part of
everyday aesthetics, and brings forth some merits that the Deweyan
approach to everyday aesthetics has over the first variation in
Shusterman’s distinction.
2. Dewey on aesthetic experience and imagination
Dewey’s Art as Experience depicts the experiential dimension of human
life as a kind of continuous transformative flow that never finds a final
rest.  Douglas Browning provides an apt description of the character of
this stream of experience that Dewey finds essential to human life:
Day after day we find ourselves within an integral part of
those ever-changing and always unique situations that
constitute our lives and mark out their shifting horizons.
Each of us is bound within this situational stream, a
stream which is never at rest, always in transit.  We
cannot stop it or freeze it even for a second…. [T]his
stream of situations in our lives is precisely that to which
Dewey refers by the term ‘experience’.[12]
An important reason why this stream of experience never finds a rest is
that our surroundings are in endless change and we constantly
encounter new situations and environments.  “[L]ife goes on in an
environment; not merely in it but because of it, through interaction
with it.”[13]  This is the heart of Dewey’s interactional view of our
relationship to our environments.  Dewey believed that we are literally
shaped by the environments we encounter and the kinds of experiences
we have in them.  Environments, for example, provide opportunities for
certain kinds of experiences, but they can also impose limits on our
ways of thinking and acting.
Dewey locates the roots of aesthetic experience in this general
interactional relationship that he sees prevailing between “the live
creature” and his or her environment.  In this respect, aesthetic
experience is not some isolated particular in the sea of experience that
makes up our lives. But there is also something exceptional in aesthetic
experience for Dewey; it forms, within the general experiential flow of
human life, a particularly heightened and complex experiential
condensation.  As is well-known, Dewey never provided a definitive
definition of aesthetic experience. However, qualities that often appear
in his analyses include cumulativeness, intensity, and fulfillment.
 Dewey contrasts aesthetic experience to what he calls “inchoate
experience,” which involves the opposite qualities.  Unlike aesthetic
experience, here the material of experience does not reach a
fulfillment.  Things follow each other, but the different points of the
experience in no way build on earlier phases of the experience or
develop them.  However, “because of continuous merging” there are
“no holes, mechanical junctions, and dead centers” in aesthetic
experience.[14]
Aesthetic experience is set off by some individual factors, such as
opening a book; directing a first glance at a painting; beginning to
listen to a piece of music; entering a natural environment or a building;
or beginning a meal or a conversation.  Aesthetic experience has a
temporal aspect, which means that the material of the experience does
not remain unchanged but the elements initiating the experience, like
the first lines of a book, merge into new ones as the experience
proceeds and complex relationships are formed between the past and
newer elements of the experience.  When these different parts of the
experience form a distinctive kind of orderly, developing unity that
stands out from the general experiential stream of our lives, the
experience in question is an aesthetic experience.  This is why Dewey
thought aesthetic experience marks “experience in its integrity.”[15]
Especially in the later parts of Art as Experience, Dewey considers
aesthetic experience more intently in light of the notion of imagination.
 Right at the beginning of Chapter Twelve, Dewey states that “esthetic
experience is imaginative.”[16]  Imagination is, of course, a highly
contested concept in philosophy and aesthetics; imagination is also a
rather tricky notion in Dewey’s philosophy.  It appears widely in his
work and different aspects are highlighted in different contexts.
 However at a basic level, Dewey uses the term 'imagination,' to refer
to a capacity to take on complex wholes and to build relationships
between the different elements making up these totalities.  In other
words, for Dewey it is “a way of seeing and feeling things as they
compose an integral whole.”[17]
The connections Dewey builds between aesthetic experience and
imagination are, in my view, explained by the distinctive features he
attributes to this form of experience.  Aesthetic experience is composed
of individual parts that fuse into new elements as the experience
proceeds, ultimately forming a distinct, complex experiential unit.
 Imagination, in the Deweyan understanding, seems to be the faculty
that keeps the experience intact and structures the experience into an
articulate, complex unity.  Imagination, in other words, guarantees the
unity of the experience but at the same time gives the experience its
structure by connecting and merging earlier parts of the experience into
new ones. As Dewey explained, “[i]maginative vision is the power that
unifies all the constituents of the matter of a work of art, making a
whole out of them in all their variety.”[18]  This kind of merging of old
and new elements is one of the key aspects of the Deweyan sense of
imagination, and this feature is, according to Dewey, most powerfully
present in aesthetic experience.
The Deweyan sense of imagination also has to do with entertaining
possibilities.  Dewey argued that it is particularly artworks that embody
possibilities “that are not elsewhere actualized.”  This aspect of
artworks makes them into important arenas for the use of imagination
in Dewey’s eyes, for the kind of embodiment of possibilities artworks
exhibit “is the best evidence that can be found of the true nature of
imagination.”[19]
It is also an important aspect of Dewey’s theory of imagination to reject
views that identify imagination with “a power that does certain things.”
 In connection with imagination, Dewey also wrote of “an imaginative
experience,” which is “what happens when varied materials of sense
quality, emotion, and meaning come together in a union that marks a
new birth in the world.”[20]  This characterization found in Dewey
seems to suggest that he did not consider imagination a mental faculty
that a person can actively operate but instances of imaginative
experience happen without conscious effort on the part of a person.  In
other words, imagination seems to be more akin to a way of
experiencing than a mental faculty like the power to entertain certain
thoughts.  
It can be argued that in describing imagination as having to do with
building relationships within a complex whole, my reading of Dewey
 fails to account for the kind of happening-like aspect that Dewey
attributes to the work of imagination.  It is true that for Dewey
imagination is not a capacity that a person can switch on and off at will.
Nevertheless, I think it can be described in the kind of terminology I
have used in my explication, for I believe the consciousness a person
has of the working of his or her imagination can take different levels.
 Sometimes a person’s experience can reach an imaginative level
without much conscious effort, for the capacity to feel things as
complex wholes that Dewey found central to imagination may be so
ingrained in a person’s character, as Dewey might put it, that no
conscious effort is needed.  In some other cases, for example when
encountering a highly complex work of art like Wagner’s Parsifal,
reaching the imaginative level in one’s experience, that is, experiencing
the work as an integral whole, may require much more conscious effort
on the part of the agent.  Also, if a person lacks a capacity to feel
things as integral wholes altogether, his or her experience cannot reach
the level of experience Dewey singled out as imaginative.  I believe
that, at least in this weaker sense sketched here, the Deweyan
understanding of imagination can be considered as a capacity or a
power of an agent.  It is, in other words, a kind of trait of a person’s
character.  
It might also be useful to explicate Dewey’s notion of imagination from
the perspective of the artist and receiver. For it might be argued that
my explication of imagination as a form of building relationships within
a complex whole looks at imagination from the side of the artist.  That
is, it is the task of the artist to build complex relationships, for example
between characters in a novel he or she is writing.  When the receiver,
in turn, manages to feel the complex relationships the artist has built,
he or she is able to experience the final work imaginatively.  Dewey
would, however, reject this dichotomy, for he did not view the activities
required from the artist and the experiencer as completely distinct since
they both involve similar phases of doing and undergoing.  That is,
according to Dewey, “taking in” an artwork “involves activities that are
comparable to those of the creator,”  and  “[R]eceptivity is not
passivity.  It, too, is a process consisting of a series of responsive acts
that accumulate toward objective fulfillment.”[21]  In this respect,
Dewey would arguably not consider feeling things as integral wholes
and building relationships between parts of a whole as distinct activities
but as two sides of the same coin.
A distinction between two forms of imagination, the imaginative and
the imaginary, is still one important element of Dewey’s view of
imagination and aesthetic experience I want raise.  The key difference
between these two forms of imagination is their relationship to the
material that serves as the basis for its functioning.  In the case of the
imaginary, it is distanced and detached because the relationship
between imagination and material cannot reach the kind of
cumulativeness that characterizes the imaginative form of imagination.
 It is imaginary, that is, illusory or fanciful, precisely in this respect.  In
cases of the imaginary, “mind and matter do not squarely meet and
interpenetrate” but rather “mind stays aloof for the most part and toys
with material rather than boldly grasping it.”[22]  Contrary to the
imaginary, the imaginative is characterized precisely by the kind of
merging of different elements that Dewey saw as essential to aesthetic
experience.  Imaginative experience, in other words, “exemplifies more
fully than any other kind of experience what experience itself is in its
very movement and structure.”[23]
3. Imagination in pragmatist ethics
Imagination has become a center of focus also in contemporary
pragmatist ethics.  Dewey had already found imagination to be “the
chief instrument of the good,”[24] and some pragmatist-inspired moral
philosophers have continued in Dewey’s footsteps by attempting to
build a more complete view of imagination’s relevance for the moral
aspects of our lives.  Now, it is my belief that some key points of this
trend of pragmatism are highly relevant to the topic of this paper,
namely Dewey and everyday aesthetics, for they reveal aspects of
value in Dewey’s conception of aesthetic experience that have not been
previously considered within everyday aesthetics.  The fuller
understanding of the significance of the Deweyan idea of aesthetic
experience revealed by the framework of pragmatist ethics also
provides a background for defending the Deweyan take on everyday
aesthetics against some criticisms, which I shall consider in the next
part of the paper.  
One of the chief background assumptions of this tradition of ethics is a
kind of “situationalist”[25] approach to moral problems, according to
which moral situations often include unique and situation-specific
features and irresolvable-seeming conflicts, for example, between
individual hopes and communal demands, that cannot be adequately
embraced with the help of abstract principles and generalizations.
 Since moral situations do not “come in duplicates,”[26] the view of
ethics arising from Dewey’s writings postulates a more limited role for
pre-established rules and principles in the encounters our moral life
consists of, and in untangling the possible situational exigencies they
may involve than more normative oriented approaches to questions of
moral philosophy.
This is where imagination enters the picture.  Steven Fesmire has
argued that imagination is precisely the sort of capacity that, with the
help of moral deliberation, can be attuned to the kind of key the
Deweyan situationalist approach to moral situations requires.  It allows
for a creative “tapping of a situation’s possibilities,” which, as we saw in
the previous section, is one of the central senses of imagination found
in Dewey’s work.[27]  Imagination, in other words, signifies “the
capacity to concretely perceive what is before us in light of what could
be” and can bring to light “undisclosed possibilities” inherent in the
situation at hand.[28]  Thus, imagination becomes an indispensable
source of material for moral deliberation.
While Fesmire has been the most important proponent of the
imagination-centered approach in contemporary pragmatist ethics, the
importance of imagination in a moral life has also been acknowledged
by other philosophers working in this tradition.  Gregory Pappas, for
example, argues that from Dewey’s texts on ethics there emerges a
view of an ideal moral self.[29]  The capacity for sympathy is one of
the important virtues of this kind of self.[30] According to Pappas, for
the concept of sympathy Dewey referred to “a special kind of
sensitivity” that consists of the ability to take on the viewpoints of other
people.  This virtue is a vital part of the ideal moral self Dewey outlined,
for with the help of sympathy, material for moral deliberation can be
acquired “that cannot be obtained through any other means.”[31] The
feeling of sympathy widens the horizon of our moral deliberation and,
according to Pappas, Dewey found it to be a key element in the
capacity to approach other people as ends in themselves.[32]
The characteristic traits of sympathy again show the importance of
imagination for the ethical vision contained in Dewey’s works. 
According to Pappas, the ability to “reach beyond one’s narrow view of
things and understand others through sympathetic communication
requires imagination, rather than the mere manipulation of
information.”[33]  Even though Dewey emphasized the affective
aspects of sympathy, the emergence of the feeling of sympathy within
a person also requires a grasp of the other’s situation and how things
look to a person in such a situation.  In other words, sympathetic
engagement with another does not primarily consist of entering another
person’s mind but requires a wider engagement with the situation of a
person. This is precisely what imagination makes possible.  Without
such understanding, a proper feeling of sympathy toward another
person could not arise.
Pappas also attaches a strong communal dimension to the feeling of
sympathy.  The emergence and development of sympathy is only
possible in certain kinds of communities and through certain kinds of
communal experiences.  Imagination is yet again a key element in both,
for “significant learning and shared experience” can only occur “when
individuals in communication are able to emotionally and imaginatively
take the role of the other.”[34]  Pappas sees the feeling of sympathy as
crucial for the emergence of a morally good self and, in fact, argues
that communities that do not provide the possibility for the kinds of
imaginative experiences at the heart of it have very little hope.[35]
Fesmire illuminates the important role he believes imagination has in
moral life with the  distinction between the imaginative and the
imaginary form of imagination mentioned earlier.  It is imagination
precisely in the imaginative sense outlined by Dewey, the vital position
of which  Fesmire seeks to defend for moral life.  Following Dewey,
Fesmire compares the imaginary form of imagination to “moral
fantasy,” and believes that it is this type of imagination to which the
negative connotations sometimes attached to imagination of “caprice”
and of mere “imagining things” apply.  These criticisms, however, do
not apply to the imaginative, for it is, in Fesmire’s words, “imbued with
sociocultural meanings and rooted in problematic conditions.”[36]
 Unlike the “mind-wandering and wayward fancy” of the imaginary,[37]
“the imaginative vision elicits possibilities that are interwoven within the
texture of the actual.”[38]  So once the notion of imagination has been
properly understood along the lines of Dewey’s imaginative sense, its
place as a “central focus in ethical theorizing” should be
acknowledged,[39] along with the key role it plays in enriching people’s
possibility of living more responsive and morally rewarding lives.[40]
4. Dewey and contemporary everyday aesthetics
Even though Dewey has been widely considered an important
background figure for the emerging field of everyday aesthetics, some
central ideas of Dewey’s aesthetics have also been seen as hard to
reconcile with the goals some of its most important theorists have
found central to it.  Attempts to build a more systematic theory of
everyday aesthetics on the principles of Dewey’s aesthetics seem to
face a key problem concerning the Deweyan notion of aesthetic
experience itself.  For it has been argued that peoples’ everyday
experiences only rarely seem to achieve the kind of rhythmic,
cumulative, and developmental character that Dewey found central to
aesthetic experience. For example, according to Yuriko Saito, Deweyan
aesthetic experiences are among “the exceptions” in the flow of
peoples’ everyday life.  She does acknowledge their significance, but
because of their rarity, the conception of aesthetic experience
understood according to Deweyan principles offers a rather limited basis
for building a comprehensive understanding of the aesthetics of
everyday life.
Instead of focusing on what Saito calls “standout experiences,” which
she considers the Deweyan aesthetic experience to be a prime
example, a theory of everyday aesthetics should focus on the
everydayness of everyday life and analyze the experiential aspects of
the everyday in terms of such concepts as recurrence, routine, and
closeness.  We do not often pay such close attention to the objects
belonging to our everyday, but they nevertheless manage to provide a
kind of silent feeling of safety for our lives.[41]  Or, as Arto Haapala,
another proponent of this trend of everyday aesthetics, formulates this
kind of concealed aesthetic character of the everyday,  “Ordinary
everyday objects lack the surprise element or freshness of the strange;
nevertheless this gives us pleasure through a kind of comforting
stability.”[42]
Thomas Leddy, however, has offered a different view of the starting
points of everyday aesthetics that exhibits a much more favorable
attitude toward Dewey’s aesthetics.  Though he finds Dewey’s
conception of aesthetic experience too narrow for covering the whole
domain of everyday life,[43] he nevertheless argues that everyday
aesthetics should pay more attention to experiences that rise above the
mundane and the ordinary than Saito considers necessary.  Most of our
everyday experiences, indeed,  do not satisfy the criteria of a Deweyan
aesthetic experience.  However, Leddy thinks this does not remove the
possibility of approaching it as “an ideal” that we should aim for.[44]  It
is not the ordinariness of the ordinary that is important but rather “the
way in which the ordinary can be made extraordinary,”[45] and
Dewey’s conception of aesthetic experience provides for Leddy an
important model for what it means to render the ordinary
extraordinary.  However, it is my belief that the way in which
imagination has been approached in the framework of pragmatist ethics
reveals lines of defense for the Deweyan take on everyday aesthetics
that Leddy does not explore.
5. Aesthetic experience and the imaginative everyday
In his interpretation of Dewey’s ethics, Fesmire places aesthetic
experience at the very heart of the vision of moral life emerging from
Dewey’s work.[46]  In his reading of Dewey, this aspect proves highly
relevant to weighing the significance of Dewey’s ideas for everyday
aesthetics.  Given the capacities considered vital for a flourishing moral
life in the conception of morality contemporary pragmatists have built
on Dewey’s views, aesthetic experience turns out to have an important
role in developing those capacities.  This is explained by the connection
Dewey builds between aesthetic experience and imagination, which I
introduced earlier.  One of the benefits of approaching Dewey’s concept
of aesthetic experience in light of his views on imagination is that it
gives a more robust sense of its structure and conditions, that is, that
it consists of a coherent, developing unity.  If aesthetic experience
indeed has this kind of structure, then it cannot be grounded on a
simple sense perception but must be underlain by more complex
mental phenomena.  I understood Dewey to refer to these with his
concept of imagination.
As we saw, imagination, indeed, is not for Dewey a power a person
possesses, like the power to move one’s arm or to think certain
thoughts.  It may not be a power to do certain things, but I argued that
imagination can, nevertheless, be considered a capacity of a person, at
least in the sense that certain people have the ability to engage with
and experience situations imaginatively and that Dewey, moreover,
thinks this ability can be developed.  If this were not the case, much of
Dewey’s writings on education would not really make much sense.
Now, if imagination and aesthetic experience are indeed connected in
the way I suggested in my reading of Dewey’s conception of aesthetic
experience in the first part of this paper, environments, artifacts,
situations, artworks, and so on, that give the possibility for aesthetic
experiences are also among the things that stir and activate our
imaginative capacities and the imaginative traits of our character.  In
other words, our imaginative capacities to see and feel things as
complex integral wholes are actively engaged when our experience
reaches an aesthetic level.  Even though Fesmire does not provide as
thorough an examination of Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience and
of its connection to imagination as I have done in this article, his
understanding of the power of aesthetic experience to sustain and
develop our imaginative capacities seems to coincide with the view
emerging from my reading of Dewey, for he wrote that “we imagine
most effectively when we live in an aesthetically funded present.”[47]
Now, in my view, the significant role that aesthetic experience turns out
to have in this pragmatist framework puts the critique leveled against
the Deweyan notion of aesthetic experience within contemporary
everyday aesthetics in a new light.  If the aesthetic aspects of our lives
can indeed have the sorts of ramifications presented above, it would
seem strange or even harmful not to include Dewey’s notion of
aesthetic experience among the central components of everyday
aesthetics.  In this respect, I support Leddy’s understanding of Dewey’s
place within everyday aesthetics.  Dewey’s notion of aesthetic
experience should be one of the cornerstones of the field, and more
investigation should be devoted to how the aesthetics of our everyday
life can contribute to the development of our imaginative capacities to
experience things and situations as integral wholes, which the
pragmatists considered important pillars of a flourishing moral life. It is
also important to notice, particularly in the context of everyday
aesthetics, that the position of imagination is not limited to the
highpoints of one’s everyday experience, that is, cases of Deweyan
“experiences,” but by helping one to get more out of the situations one
faces in one’s everyday, it can enliven everyday life in a more general
sense.[48]
The Deweyan conception of everyday aesthetics developed in this
article also provides a new perspective on another point of controversy
between Leddy and Saito.  Leddy criticizes Saito’s take on everyday
aesthetics for ruling out art from its domain in a too categorical
way.[49]  The problem he sees in this kind of approach to everyday
aesthetics is that it is in danger of overlooking the ways in which
everyday life serves as a source of inspiration for many artists, and the
different ways in which art can have an effect on our experience and
perception of everyday life. Instead of exclusion, Leddy suggests that
everyday aesthetics should devote more attention to “the dynamic
relationship” that he thinks prevails between art and the everyday.[50]
Leddy’s criticism of Saito is, again, in line with Dewey’s views, for one
of the central points of Dewey’s critique of the museum conception of
art is to reveal the artificiality of all sharp distinctions between art and
the everyday.  Leddy’s insistence on the need for a further examination
of the dynamic relationship he believes there is between art and the
everyday actually and interestingly draws attention to the other side of
Dewey’s famous critique.  An attempt to undermine the dichotomy
between art and the everyday by focusing on the potential many
everyday items and events have for engendering experiences of the
aesthetic kind is surely an important part of that critique.  However, it
is an equally important goal of Dewey’s criticism to highlight the fact
that the effect of the experiences we undergo in museums and concert
halls do not cease at their front doors but can, in a way, live on and
heighten the quality of our everyday lives.
Further insight into this aspect of Dewey’s critique of the museum
conception of art is provided by the distinction Dewey made between an
art product and a work of art. With this distinction, Dewey tries to draw
attention to two sides of an artwork.  The concept ‘art product’ refers to
artworks as concrete physical objects.  The other pole of this conceptual
distinction highlights the experiential aspects and dynamic potentials
artworks possess.  That is, for Dewey the work of art is “what the
product does, its working,” and ideally the product’s working marks “the
beginning of a complex interaction.”[51]
When combined with Dewey’s critique of the museum conception of art,
this distinction implies that museums and other art institutions should
not be seen as mere containers for art products but should also actively
seek out the means of enhancing the potential of the products they
contain. Thus, museums would serve as spurs for complex interactions,
thereby extending the effect of imaginative experiences people have in
connection with artworks to their everyday lives.  So from a Deweyan
perspective, excluding art from the domain of everyday aesthetics does
not only appear arbitrary but it may even be potentially harmful. What
is needed is more investigation on the dynamic relationship between art
and the everyday, which Leddy frames as a central question for
everyday aesthetics.
The points of emphasis apparent in the Deweyan approach to everyday
aesthetics listed here show why it can be considered a primary example
of the second variant of everyday aesthetics in Shusterman’s distinction
introduced at the beginning of this paper.  This kind of take on everyday
aesthetics does not merely propose a certain analysis of aesthetic
experience but puts forth reasons why such experiences are significant
and tries to develop means for making them more omnipresent
phenomena in people’s everyday lives.  
Now, I have said very little about the pragmatic or reconstructive
aspects of the Deweyan approach to everyday aesthetics developed in
this paper, that is, about the ways in which the characteristic features
Dewey lists for aesthetic experience can be made into essential parts of
the experiential dimensions of people’s everyday life.[52]  But needless
to say, this would mean a close look at the environments people
inhabit, the kinds of interactions they afford, and how those
environments need to be transformed so that they allow a ground for
aesthetic and imaginative engagements of the Deweyan kind.  This
examination needs to be left for another occasion.  However, what I
hope to have shown in this article is the significance of such
undertakings, and that the line of everyday aesthetics taking its
inspiration from Dewey uncovers important paths of research that
should be further explored within everyday aesthetics.
The pragmatist understanding of everyday aesthetics also reveals
problematic aspects in some other recent conceptions of everyday
aesthetics.  In Art as Experience, Dewey outlined two possible worlds in
which aesthetic experience could not occur.  In one of Dewey’s
scenarios, aesthetic experience is depicted as an impossible
phenomenon in a world that is “finished, ended.”  Aesthetic experience
could not occur in this kind of world because it lacks the elements of
“suspense and crisis” and, therefore, there would be “no opportunity for
resolution.”  “Where everything is already complete,” experience could
not develop cumulatively nor could it reach a closing fulfillment in the
way aesthetic experience, in Dewey’s understanding, requires.[53]
The world so portrayed by Dewey comes strikingly close to a world that
is saturated by familiarity and routines, that is, by qualities where the
first variant of everyday aesthetics in Shusterman’s taxonomy searches
for the proper aesthetic character of the everyday.  From a Deweyan
perspective, this would be an aesthetic world only in a rather barren
sense of the term.  Though critical of Dewey, Saito incorporates within
her conception of everyday aesthetics what she calls “the hidden gems”
of the everyday within which she includes such things as “the cracks on
the floor boards, the way in which mold and mildew grow, and the oil
stains on the driveway surface.”[54]  In her view, these sorts of
surprising phenomena are important sources of enrichment of everyday
life and they disrupt in a positive sense the routine-like character of our
everyday life.  Thus, it is debatable how far Dewey’s picture of an
unaesthetic world corresponds with the conception of the everyday
implied by Saito’s theory of everyday aesthetics.
However, the world portrayed by Dewey bears some significant
similarities at least with Haapala’s understanding of everyday
aesthetics, and Dewey’s account also raises some genuine worries
about it.  For, if Dewey’s analysis of the relationship between aesthetic
experience and imagination is accurate, then the kind of world in which
Dewey finds aesthetic experience an impossible phenomenon would
also provide very little stimulation for our imagination.  One of the
primary goals of the Deweyan take on everyday aesthetics sketched in
this paper is precisely to find ways of avoiding this kind of world and, in
this respect, it stands in stark contrast with theories that build an
aesthetics of everyday life on the everydayness of the everyday.[55]
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